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The goal of this paper is to examine the impact of Initial Public Offerings (IPO) on the 
investment strategies of young entrepreneurial firms.  Hypotheses are developed from the 
finance, strategy and top management team literature.  These are then tested using multivariate 
methods in order to study post-IPO investment behavior of a global sample of young Internet 
firms. 
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Growth is considered to be one of the most important objectives of entrepreneurial 
firms
1
 (e.g. McGee, Dowling and Megginson (1995); Shrader and Shelton (2001)).  In order to 
achieve its growth objectives, a firm has to leverage existing and invest in new financial 
resources in order to gain access to productive resources or resource combinations (Chatterjee 
(1990); Hahn (1970); Küting (1980)).  In this context, we assume that the Initial Public 
Offering (IPO) is an important milestone in the new venture life cycle.  Typically, 
entrepreneurial firms are characterized by resource constraints and a liability of newness 
(Lechner (2001); Stinchcombe (1965)) which hinders the development of the company 
compared to capital-rich established firms.  Through an IPO in the early stage of the life cycle a 
young firm can overcome this resource scarcity.  Furthermore, the abundance of financial 
resources post-IPO opens a broader array of possible investment strategies.  According to the 
conventional entrepreneurship literature, the investment behavior of new ventures is commonly 
reduced to the internal development of resources and activities (Dowling and Drumm (2002); 
Shrader and Shelton (2001)) mainly due to their capital limitations.  However, other researchers 
argue that acquisitions and cooperative arrangements can also be used by younger firms as 
effective external sources of growth (Lechner (2001); McCann (1991); McGee et al. (1995); 
Schultz and Zaman (2001); Shrader and Shelton (2001)). So far, little is known about the 
impact of an IPO on the investment strategies of entrepreneurial firm’s post-IPO through 
acquisition and cooperation.  Due to this knowledge gap, our two central research questions 
are:  
1. What influence does an IPO have on the acquisition and cooperative 
strategies of an entrepreneurial firm? 
2. What are the key drivers behind post-IPO investment behavior?  
 
I. Theoretical Development and Hypotheses 
A. From resource constraints to investment options 
There is a lack of theoretical and empirical research addressing the impact of an IPO on 
the investment strategies of entrepreneurial firms.  However, some prior research was useful in 
developing our hypotheses. For example, in a study of newly listed companies’ growth and 
investment behavior, Schultz and Zaman (2001) tested the hypothesis that young Internet firms 
go public in order to rapidly increase their market share and to gain a competitive advantage 
through first mover effects.  They expected Internet firms to acquire other companies quickly 
using some of their IPO proceeds, therefore showing a higher number of mergers and 
acquisitions post-IPO than a control sample of public technology firms without Internet related 
business models.  The empirical results showed that Internet firms made significantly more and 
larger acquisitions than non-Internet firms.  
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as well as cooperative arrangements can be seen as 
external growth strategies (Lechner (2001); McCann (1991); McGee et al. (1995); Schultz and 
Zaman (2001); Shrader and Shelton (2001)).  While some firms might have a stronger focus on 
M&A-activities or on cooperation arrangements, these strategies are not mutually exclusive 
(Lechner 2001).  Firms can therefore pursue both at the same time.  
                                                          
1
 By entrepreneurial firms we mean new ventures that plan from the start to grow quickly and become significantly 
larger, in contrast to “small businesses” that remain small (Plaschka (1990)). 
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Shrader and Shelton (2001) conducted a study regarding the different expansion modes 
of new ventures.  Following the traditional diversification literature (e.g. Chatterjee (1990); 
Chatterjee and Singh (1999); Yip (1982)), the authors examined internal development and the 
acquisition of other firms as two important alternative strategies for growth, and tested several 
hypotheses on the factors influencing the firm’s choice of strategy and the performance 
implications.  The sample was classified into two sub-groups: “acquirer” and “internal 
developer” with every third new venture growing through acquisitions.  A logistic regression 
analysis showed that acquirers consistently outperformed internal developers on different 
performance measures.  These findings strongly indicated that growth through acquisitions 
could be a viable strategy for young new ventures.  In addition, other research has suggested 
that cooperative relationships also provide an important means for promoting firm growth (e.g. 
McGee, Dowling and Megginson (1995)). 
Given that entrepreneurial firms pre-IPO are often considered to be internal developers, 
and the resource constraints of these young firms, we expect IPOs to have a significant impact 
on the investment strategies of young high-growth firms, i.e. the firms will pursue external 
growth strategies through acquisitions and cooperative arrangements. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Initial Public Offerings lead to a significant increase in the propensity 
for young firms to engage in mergers, acquisitions, and cooperative 
arrangements as a source for external growth. 
 
B. Cash-richness and acquisitions 
In order to study the investment behavior and the subsequent growth of firms post-IPO, 
we identified from the literature a variety of characteristics as possible drivers.  The most 
obvious characteristic of the newly listed firm is its financial profile, which is the basis for 
access to productive growth resources (Chatterjee (1990)).  Through the inflow of the IPO 
proceeds, a radical improvement in the financial situation of entrepreneurial firms usually 
occurs (Lechner (2001); Timmons (1994)).  This relative cash richness post-IPO is likely to 
influence both the investment behavior and growth of the firms.  Due to the increased financial 
strength post-IPO, the realization of more capital intensive investment strategies like 
acquisitions becomes more feasible (Dowling and Drumm (2002)).  On the other hand, the 
abundance of financial resources is also likely to reduce the firms’ need to invest in less capital 
intensive growth strategies such as cooperative arrangements (Hammes (1994); Padberg 
(2000)).  
 
Hypothesis 2. The greater the liquidity (cash-richness) of young firms post-IPO, the 
greater the propensity to make acquisitions and the less the propensity to 
invest in cooperative arrangements. 
 
C. Ownership structure: Strategic partners versus financial investors 
Another firm characteristic that should have an impact on the post-IPO investment 
strategy is the ownership structure of the firm.  Regarding the possible influence of other 
ownership groups, Allen and Phillips (2000) found a positive relation between the firm 
performance and the presence of strategic partners with block holdings greater than 5%.  While 
financial investors are primarily exit oriented and provide short-term capital for expansion, 
strategic partners follow a long-term cooperation strategy and allow access to a broad array of 
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growth resources (Das and Teng (2000); Gulati (1998); Hellmann (2002); Jarillo (1989)).  Due 
to better resource access, we expect young IPO firms with a high number of strategic partners 
to show a reduced need for external growth through acquisitions.  Furthermore, we predict that 
strategic partners have a positive effect on the future propensity of young firms to invest in 
cooperative arrangements in order to expand their corporate networks.  We expect financial 
investors to have a positive influence on the IPO firm’s propensity to grow externally through 
acquisition due to a greater interest in short-term growth rather than through quick results that 
would allow a value maximizing exit for these investors.  Consistent with these considerations, 
we expect to find a negative relationship between the level of financial investor ownership 
post-IPO and the firm’s propensity to invest in cooperative arrangements. 
 
Hypothesis 3a. The higher the degree of ownership by strategic partners post-IPO, the 
less the young firm’s propensity to invest in acquisitions and, the 
greater the young firm’s propensity to invest in cooperative 
arrangements. 
 
Hypothesis 3b. The higher the degree of ownership by financial investors post-IPO, the 
greater the young firm’s propensity to invest in acquisitions, and, the 
less the young firm’s propensity to invest in cooperative arrangements. 
 
 D. Top management experience and investment strategies 
Another critical factor in a young firm’s development is the experience of the top 
management team (TMT).  By definition, an entrepreneurial firm suffers from its liability of 
newness (Shrader and Shelton (2001); Stinchcombe (1965)).  However, current research on 
TMT issues showed that the experience of management team members can compensate for this 
disadvantage (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990); Goll, Sambharya and Tucci (2001)).  
Research also suggests that experienced management teams are able to handle organizational 
complexity better than inexperienced teams (Carpenter and Fredrickson (2001); Hambrick and 
Mason (1984)).  Thus, management experience increases the ability of the entrepreneurial firm 
to engage in more M&A and cooperative arrangements.  Regarding the quality of corporate 
investment decisions, Weinzimmer (1997) argues that management teams with functional 
experience in the finance area especially are better able to allocate financial resources 
efficiently, leading to superior firm performance.  The increased ability to manage complexity 
should also affect a firm’s propensity to acquire and cooperate.  Reuber and Fischer (1997) find 
a positive relation between the TMT experience and the propensity to join strategic alliances.  
McGee et al. (1995) confirm the positive influence of TMT experience on the success of 
cooperative arrangements.  We therefore expect the TMT’s management experience, in 
particular financial experience, will allow for the management of more M&A’s and cooperative 
arrangements.   
 
Hypothesis 4. The greater the financial experience of a young firm’s TMT post-IPO, 
the greater its propensity to invest in cooperative arrangements. 
 
 E. Strategic consistency and investment strategies 
Additionally, we expect the investment strategies pre-IPO to have a positive impact on 
the chosen investment strategies post-IPO.  In particular, those firms that have already grown 
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externally through acquisitions pre-IPO will continue with this strategy post-IPO.  Young firms 
with intensive cooperative experience in the period before they went public are also likely to 
show a higher propensity to invest in cooperative arrangements post-IPO.  These arguments are 
based on the research of Parnell (1994) and Kim and McIntosh (1996), who showed that 
strategic consistency has a positive influence on a firm’s performance.  The IPO allows 
entrepreneurial firms to pursue the same growth logic with higher intensity. 
 
Hypothesis 5.   The greater a young firm’s propensity to invest in acquisitions and 
cooperative arrangements pre-IPO, the greater is its propensity to 
invest in acquisitions and cooperative arrangements post-IPO. 
 
II. METHODOLOGY 
 A. The Sample 
We developed a new database for this study of young high-growth firms in the Internet 
industry that were listed for the first time in the US, Germany, Italy, France, UK or Asia 
between January 1996 and December 2000.  Internet firms were chosen because they were the 
driving force behind the “New Economy” IPO rush and a good example of firms going public 
very early in their life cycle.  To identify individual firms for the sample, a comprehensive list 
of companies which conducted their IPO during this time period was compiled from various 
sources, including Bloomberg, Hoovers and Reuters Business Briefing databases.  The firms 
were chosen according to five main criteria. They had to have gone public by December 31, 
2000, and had to be internet firms dealing in content, commerce, context or connection (Wirtz 
(2000)).  Their activities were limited to business to consumer interactions.  In addition, only 
those firms with a global focus on Internet sales were selected.  The final criterion was that the 
issue prospectus, the post-IPO annual reports and the websites had to be in English, German or 
Spanish.  As a consequence, we have a sample with basically no industry biases (internet base 
business-to-consumer-business) that operate a global scale therefore also reducing possible 
country bias. 
Consistent with recent entrepreneurship research, firms were classified as “young” if 
they were younger than eight years old (McCann (1991); McGee et al. (1995); Mulzer (1999)) 
at the time of their IPO.  Furthermore, a company had to show pre-IPO compound annual 
growth rates of at least 30% in sales, total assets, or employees. Of our starting sample of 196 
companies, 132 firms met these criteria.  The sample size provided variable-to-observation 
ratios of 13 : 1 and 6 : 1 for our regression models, fulfilling the most conservative multiple 
regression requirements (Backhaus, Erichson, Plinke and Weiber (2000); McGee et al. (1995)). 
Information on IPOs was obtained from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC), the 
NASDAQ, the Deutsche Börse AG and Reuters Business Briefing.  For each IPO we collected 
the IPO date, total number of shares sold, offering price and first-day opening price.  The 
company data on liquidity, ownership structure, top management team experience, operating 
performance and the acquisition and cooperation transactions pre-IPO were either drawn 
directly or via content analysis from the IPO prospectuses and the annual reports available.  
Acquisition and cooperation data post-IPO were derived from Bloomberg and cross-checked 
with the information in the annual reports.  Overall, 1,013 transactions were identified in this 
way. 
 Summary statistics for our sample are provided in Table I.  Median values have been 
highlighted due to the higher sensitivity of the mean value to outliers (Degeorge and 
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Zeckhauser (1993); Jain and Kini (1994)).  Year t-1 is the fiscal year preceding the year in 
which the firm went public.  The mean (median) age of the firms at IPO was 3.4 (3.3) years.  
The mean (median) net IPO proceeds raised by these firms is € 110.7 (€ 34.2) million. 
 
 B. Measures  
We measured the variable liquidity post-IPO as the sum of a firm’s cash, cash 
equivalents and short-term investments divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year t=0 
(IPO year).  The IPO liquidity effect was calculated as a percentage by dividing the IPO net 
proceeds by the total assets of the fiscal year prior to IPO (t-1). 
Ownership was calculated as a percentage of the number of shares held by a certain 
owner group post-IPO divided by the number of total shares outstanding post-IPO.  The 
ownership data were derived directly from the IPO prospectus.  Three different owner groups 
were used in this study.  Founding and management team members were classified as “Founder 
and Management”.  Venture capitalists, business angels and other financial institutions (e.g. 
banks, insurance companies) were classified as “financial investors”.  Industrial partners and 
corporate venture capitalists were classified as “strategic investors” due to their long-term 
strategic interest in the investment (Hellmann (2002)). 
We used two measures of top management team experience in our study (McGee et al. 
(1995)).  “Overall management experience” measures the total number of years of management 
experience of all members of the TMT at the time of the firm’s IPO, independent of any 
functional areas.  Overall management experience should have a positive influence on both 
M&A and cooperative arrangement propensity.  The second measure focuses on prior 
experience in the area of finance and was measured by the sum of years of the firm’s TMT 
members in former finance-related management functions (e.g. CFO, vice president finance, 
managing director of an investment bank, partner in an accounting firm).  The data on TMT 
experience were collected via content analysis of the TMT biographical sketches in the IPO 
prospectuses. 
We employed M&A propensity and cooperation propensity as measures of the 
corporate investment strategy.  Investments to achieve internal growth are considered a young 
firm’s basic strategy, that is realized independently of other growth modes (Küting (1980); 
McCann (1991)).  We measured a firm’s propensity to acquire other companies pre- and post-
IPO by dividing the number of completed M&A transactions (majority investments >50%, 
strategic investments >25.1%, asset purchases) pre- and post-IPO by the length of time it was 
private (age at IPO) and the length of time it had been public.  Minority investments were 
considered as a form of cooperative investments which guarantees to the partner firm strategic 
and economic independence while strengthening the relationship (Richardson 1972).  
Consistently, we measured the cooperation propensity of a firm pre- and post-IPO by dividing 
the number of cooperative arrangements with equity investments (strategic alliances with 
minority investment <25.1%, joint ventures) by the firm’s age at IPO and the length of time it 
had been public.  The data on the investment strategies were collected until December 31 (2001 
and for a maximum duration of three periods after going public (t+3) because these years are 
arguably affected by the IPO.  An average measure was chosen in order to correct for different 
numbers of periods pre- and post-IPO depending on the firm. 
We chose a firm’s age at IPO and total assets in t=0 as controls for age and size effects 
which could influence a firm’s investment strategies and performance. 
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 C. Statistical Analyses 
We tested our base Hypothesis 1 regarding the expected IPO effect on a young firm’s 
investment behavior by using paired T-test statistics.  This method allows for the comparison of 
one variable in pairs in order to analyze differences in the mean values between two 
observation points (Brosius (1998)).  We compared each M&A propensity, cooperation 
propensity and overall deal propensity pre- and post-IPO to find significant differences in 
investment behavior before and after going public.  Due to our sample size N>50, the normal 
distribution requirements of the parametric T-test procedure can be neglected (Eckstein 
(2000)). 
Two multiple regression models were used to test the remaining hypotheses 
simultaneously.  The dependent variables in the alternative models are M&A propensity 
(Model 1) and cooperation propensity post-IPO (Model 2).  Tests for each hypothesis were 
determined by the individual regression equation for each of the independent variables.  All 
models were controlled for homoskedasticity, auto-correlation and normal distribution of 
residuals and multicollinearity of the independent variables to ensure that the data were 
appropriate for multiple regression analysis (Brosius (1998); Backhaus et al. (2000)). 
 
III. RESULTS 
 A. Test of Hypothesis 1 
Table II provides the key statistics from the paired T-test.  Hypothesis 1 predicted that 
IPOs will lead to a significant change in the former investment strategies of young firms. 
Results of the T-test procedures regarding the differences between the investment propensities 
before and after going public strongly support our view that IPOs have a significant impact on a 
young firm’s investment strategy.  As the above statistics clearly show, all T-tests reveal highly 
significant differences in the mean values of the different investment propensities.  This IPO 
effect becomes most obvious concerning the firms’ M&A propensity, which is over four times 
higher post-IPO than pre-IPO.  Despite the significant increase in the cooperation post-IPO, the 
relative importance of cooperative investments decreases.  While the ratio of the mean M&A to 
the mean cooperation propensity pre-IPO is at 2.8, this ratio increases to 4.8 post-IPO, showing 
a clear rise in the importance of M&A transactions as an investment alternative post-IPO. 
Overall, the results from the T-test statistics support our Hypothesis 1 that IPOs lead to a 
significant change in the investment strategies of young firms. 
 
 B. Tests of Hypotheses 2 to 5 
Table III presents the results of the multiple regression model 1 with M&A propensity 
post-IPO as the dependent variable.  Table IV provides the regression results used to test the 
hypotheses regarding the factors influencing the cooperation propensity of the firms post-IPO 
(Model 2). Both models were significant at the 0.1% level.  Results of Model 1 indicated that, 
as hypothesized, the M&A propensity pre-IPO was positively related to M&A propensity post-
IPO (hypothesis 5).  With a standardized coefficient of 0.430, M&A propensity pre-IPO had 
the greatest influence in our model to explain the firms’ propensity to acquire after going 
public.  In addition, as argued, the ownership degree of strategic investors was negatively 
related to M&A propensity post-IPO (hypothesis 3a).  Contrary to Hypothesis 3b, however, the 
ownership degree by financial investors was also negatively related (p < 0.05) to the young 
firms’ M&A propensity post-IPO.  No statistically significant relationships were found 
regarding the remaining variables on liquidity and financial experience.  Thus, there was no 
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support for these hypotheses.  Overall, the analysis did not show any significant age,  size 
effects or management experience effects. 
The results of regression model 2 supported Hypotheses 2, 3b, 4 and 5.  Thus, young 
firms’ cash richness and the ownership degree by financial investors were negatively related to 
cooperation propensity post-IPO.  Additionally, cooperation propensity post-IPO was 
positively related to the financial experience, and the cooperation propensity pre-IPO was 
positively related to cooperation propensity post-IPO.  Surprisingly, and opposite our 
Hypothesis 3a, these results show a significant negative influence of the degree of ownership 
by strategic investors on the young firms’ cooperation propensity.  Again, the control variables 
did not have any significant influence. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Overall, the results of this study support our central argument that IPOs of young high-
growth firms lead to significant changes in the former investment strategies.  In particular, we 
observed a significant increase in the firms’ propensity for M&A activities post-IPO in the 
form of acquisitions, strategic investments and asset purchases.  The significant increase in 
M&A activities during the three years after going public also supports the research of Schultz 
and Zaman (2001) that Internet firms go public to gain market shares and acquire economies of 
scale quickly. 
Our regression analysis provided important indications regarding the factors related to 
the two different types of investment strategies.  Firms with a high M&A propensity pre-IPO 
also showed a higher M&A propensity post-IPO.  This positive relation might be due to 
important learning effects (e.g. better identification of target firms, process understanding, 
negotiation experience, consultancy network) from former M&A transactions that help firms to 
execute future M&A projects faster.  As we hypothesized (H3a), strategic investors seem to 
have a restrictive influence on the young firms’ propensity to acquire other companies.  We 
argued that this is due to a reduced need for a young firm to grow externally because of the 
access to the strategic partners’ resource pool.  Another explanation could be the increased 
control rights and the long-term interest of a strategic partner that might hinder the process for a 
young firm’s strategic investment decisions. Finally, we found no support for a relationship 
between liquidity and M&A propensity (H2).  The confirmation of hypothesis 1 shows that the 
IPO has a strong impact on the intensification of external growth strategies.  The relative cash-
richness seems to make an additional difference for what concerns M&A-strategies.  
Concerning, cooperative strategies, we found only weak support (H2) for a negative 
relationship between a firm’s liquidity position post-IPO and the cooperation propensity.  We 
found support for our hypothesis (4) that the financial experience positively influences the 
young firms’ propensity to invest in cooperative arrangements like strategic alliances and joint 
ventures.  We argued that this effect is due to the greater ability of financially experienced 
managers to handle the resources of a young firm and to find less capital intensive investment 
alternatives.  Hypothesis 3b was also supported, in that firms with a high number of financial 
investors show less propensity for cooperation post-IPO.  Our argument was that financial 
investors are exit-oriented and more interested in short-term successes. The role of financial 
investors in both models is, however, intriguing.  Our analysis suggests that financial investors 
in general put the brakes on external growth strategies, i.e. they seem to favor the internal 
development of the firms, i.e. firm-specific value creation.  In contrary to what the literature 
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assumes, for this sample financial investors were less interested in fast exit than in firm-specific 
value creation (Shrader and Shelton 2001).   
As hypothesized (H5), we found the cooperation propensity post-IPO to be positively 
influenced by the firms’ cooperation propensity pre-IPO.  Overall, we find the pre-IPO 
investment behavior of the firms to be the most important factor influencing the investment 
strategies post-IPO.  This can be interpreted as young firms’ positive experience of more 
externally oriented growth strategies and therefore partly contradicts the conventional view of 
young companies merely following a strategy of internal development pre-IPO.   Therefore, 
firms remain strategically consistent but use the IPO as an accelerator of its previous growth 
logic even if cash-richness tempts those firms that had a cooperative propensity pre-IPO. 
Some results, however, contradict the predictions of our hypotheses. In Model 2, 
ownership by strategic investors was negatively related to the firms’ propensity to invest in 
cooperative arrangements post-IPO.  This result may be due to the increased controlling rights 
and the long-term interests of strategic investors that obviously reduce the young firms’ 
independence regarding the realization of strategic alliances and/or joint ventures. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Our results clearly demonstrate that IPO’s have a significant effect on the intensity and 
type of investment strategy chosen by young firms. Our study contributes to the fields of 
entrepreneurship, strategic management and corporate finance by examining the nexus between 
a young firm’s decision to go public and its investment behavior.  Future research should focus 
on the identification and in-depth analysis of additional factors influencing a young firm’s 
investment strategy at the time of the IPO and its longer-term operating performance post-IPO.  
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Table I 
Sample Summary Statistics 
    Variable Mean Median N 
        Age at IPO 3.4 years 3.3 years 132 
Net sales t-1 €21.9m €3.5m 131 
CAGR sales Pre-IPO 768% 284% 113 
Total assets t-1 €27.3m €7.7m 131 
Employees t-1 163 68 128 
Liquidity t-1 €11.1m €2.9m 131 
Operating Cash Flow t-
1 
€ (6.1m) € (2.8m) 129 
EBIT t-1 € (11.3m) € (5.1m) 131 
Net profit t-1 € (11.6m) € (5.0m) 131 
IPO issue volume €125.5m €62.8m 132 






T-test Statistics (Hypothesis 1) 
     Overall deal propensity M&A propensity Cooperation propensity 
     (N=132) (N=132) (N=132) 
        pre-IPO post-IPO pre-IPO post-IPO pre-IPO post-IPO 
       Mean 0.64 2.61 0.47 2.16 0.17 0.45 
       Correlation r 0.532*** 0.513*** 0.422*** 
       
T-value -7.933*** -8.165*** -3.753*** 
 * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table III 
Regression Results Model 1 
Factors Influencing M&A Propensity Post-IPO 
 
    N = 115 Coefficient Standardized 
Coefficient 
T-value 
        1 Intercept 3.018  3.723*** 
    2 Liquidity t=0 (H2) -0.449 -0.055 -0.649 
    3 Strategic investors (H3a) -0.040 -0.222 -2.593** 
    4 Financial investors (H3b) -0.026 -0.174 -2.047** 
    5 Financial experience (H4) -0.004 -0.007 -0.080 
        6. M&A propensity pre-IPO 
(H5) 
1.106 0.430 4.967*** 
    CONTROLS    
7. Management experience  -0.002 -0.016 -0.175 
8 Age at IPO -0.076 -0.047 -0.566 
    9 Total assets t=0 0.000 0.023 0.272 
        R
2
 0.303*** * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
    Adjusted R
2
 0.244 F= 5.01***  
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Table IV 
Regression Results Model 2 
Factors Influencing Cooperation Propensity Post-IPO 
 
    N = 115 Coefficient Standardized 
Coefficient 
T-value 
        1 Intercept 0.426  1.880* 
    2 Liquidity t=0 (H2) -0.301 -0.146 -1.671* 
    3 Strategic investors (H3a) -0.009 -0.200 -2.260** 
    4 Financial investors (H3b) -0.008 -0.195 -2.234** 
    5 Financial experience (H4) 0.049 0.348 3.823*** 
        6. Coop. propensity pre-IPO 
(H5) 
0.465 0.190 2.057** 
    CONTROLS    
7. Management experience -0.002 -0.057 -0.057 
8 Age at IPO 0.017 0.039 0.451 
    9 Total assets t=0 0.000 0.113 1.236 
        R
2
 0.259*** * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
    Adjusted R
2
 0.196 F= 4,01***  
 
